This paper analyzes the role of macroprudential policies in a low interest-rate environment, in which monetary policy can be occasionally restricted by a lower bound. We study this issue by using a DSGE model with housing and collateral constraints. The macroprudential instrument is a loanto-value ratio (LTV) rule. We …nd that, when the steady-state interest rate is high, the two policies can work independently with di¤erent instruments and separate objectives. When the steady-state interest rate is low, however, monetary policy hits the zero lower bound more frequently and the macroprudential authority can act as a complementary macro-…nancial stabilizer for both real and …nancial cycles.
Introduction
In the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) world, there are new challenges to the conduct of macro…nancial stabilization policies. One of the major changes in this new environment is a signi…cant decline in the neutral real interest rate. In many advanced economies, estimated long-term neutral rates have declined to much lower levels compared to the pre-crisis period and show no sign of recovery (Laubach and Williams, 2015) . This is challenging for policy makers for two reasons. First, low neutral rates limit the scope of conventional monetary policy in stabilizing the economy. Second, low interest rates raise concerns about …nancial imbalances and risks to …nancial stability (Borio, 2016) .
The GFC has shown that the zero (or e¤ective) lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates is not just a theoretical concern. Economies encounter this lower bound with much higher probability than was previously believed. A critical implication of a low interest-rate environment is that, when central banks use conventional monetary policy to stabilize the economy, the nominal interest rate may indeed hit its lower bound. The ZLB constraint makes it more di¢ cult for traditional monetary policy to stabilize the economy. The immediate consequence of the limited e¤ectiveness of monetary policy is that business cycles may be more unstable. Moreover, persistently low interest rates may also have important implications for …nancial stability. In fact, low interest rates a¤ect incentives of …nancial market participants, leading to excessive risk-taking behavior. For instance, the yield-chasing motive encourages agents to engage in speculative investment in assets, such as real estate. Low interest rates may increase the likelihood of asset bubbles and excessive leverage. 1 In this paper, we argue that, in a low interest-rate environment, the case for using macroprudential policies becomes even stronger. On the one hand, greater …nancial instability due to low interest rates calls for macroprudential policies to contain …nancial risks. On the other hand, macroprudential policy may also be useful to complement monetary policy, when it is subject to the lower bound. 2 To illustrate this point, we build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with collateral constraints on borrowers and an occasionally binding ZLB for the interest rate. Monetary policy in the model is described by a standard Taylor rule, which is subject to an occasionally binding ZLB. Macroprudential policy is characterized by a rule on the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) that responds to deviations of credit and output from their respective steady states. We calibrate the model to match a low interest-rate environment by setting the steady-state interest rate equal to 2%. 3 We solve the model using the "occbin" toolkit proposed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) .
Using this framework, we answer the following research questions: …rst, without an active role for macroprudential policy, what are the consequences of a steady-state interest rate falling from 4% to 2% for business and …nancial cycles? Second, can macroprudential policy contribute to both …nancial and macroeconomic stability in the low interest-rate environment?
Our simulation results show that, in a 2% steady-state interest-rate environment, the nominal interest rate hits the ZLB more frequently and stays there for longer periods than in a model with a 4% steadystate interest rate. This, in turn, leads to both volatile macroeconomic and …nancial cycles. There are two channels that give rise to more volatile macro dynamics: …rstly, through collateral e¤ects, negative productivity shocks drive down house prices and tighten the collateral constraint for the borrowers.
This, in turn, negatively a¤ects credit. This feedback loop between house prices and credit gives rise to a powerful …nancial accelerator, emphasized in Iacoviello (2005) . Secondly, when the interest rate is restricted by the occasionally binding ZLB, it provides an additional ampli…cation of the shock. In this case, the anticipation that the interest rate will be forced to stay at zero for certain periods reinforces the e¤ects of the negative productivity shock. In ‡ation falls and pushes up the real cost of borrowing.
This, in turn, depresses house prices and credit even further than under the collateral channel.
Having shown that, in a low interest-rate environment, the occasionally binding ZLB leads to more volatile real and …nancial cycles, we move on to study the e¤ects of active macroprudential policy rules as a complement to a less e¤ective monetary policy. In particular, we compute the optimal simple rule for the LTV by minimizing a loss function for the macroprudential regulator. We consider an LTV rule that responds to credit and output gaps. We …nd that, in the 4% interest-rate environment, 2 In policy debates, the use of macroprudential policies to act as macroeconomic stabilizers is controversial, since these policies are designed for other goals. Nevertheless, the ZLB is an extreme case in which monetary policy is in real need for alternatives (Caruana, 2011) . 3 Hamilton et al (2015) interpret the equilibrium level of the real federal funds rate as the long run or steady-state value of the real funds rate. countercyclical macroprudential policies can lead to more stable …nancial cycles, while business cycles can be e¤ectively managed by monetary policy, because the ZLB is rarely binding. In this case, the so-called "Tinbergen principle" applies: macroeconomic stability can be assigned to the monetary authority, while the macroprudential authority only takes care of …nancial stability. The two policies work independently with di¤erent instruments. By contrast, when the steady-state interest rate falls to 2% and monetary policy is occasionally restricted, the two policy spheres interdependent. In particular, macroprudential tools may materially contribute to the management of aggregate demand. 4 Our simulations show that, in the low interest-rate environment, a purely …nancial-stability focused macroprudential authority needs to use its instrument more aggressively to stabilize …nancial cycles than in normal times. Furthermore, we …nd that allowing macroprudential policy to respond directly to output strengthens economic stability, because a binding ZLB not only makes monetary policy ine¤ective, but also becomes an additional ampli…cation channel of aggregate shocks.
Our paper is related to the strand of research that, following Iacoviello (2005) …nd that macroprudential policies act as a useful complement to forward guidance policy during ZLB periods. Our paper abstracts from unconventional monetary policy, but we …nd a similar result regarding complementarity between LTV rules and monetary policy. Lewis and Villa (2016) study the interactions between monetary policy and a countercyclical capital bu¤er when monetary policy is constrained at the ZLB. Korinek and Simsek (2016) …nd that when the interest rate is limited by the ZLB, welfare can be improved by ex-ante macroprudential policies such as debt limits and mandatory insurance requirements. Our paper complements this literature and contributes by studying the interaction between LTV policy and monetary policy in a low interest-rate environment, in which the ZLB for the interest rate occasionally binds.
The rest of the paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 shows the dynamics of the model allowing for the ZLB constraint. Section 4 compares simulations for normal times and a low interest-rate environment. Section 5 analyzes macroprudential policy implementation. Section 6 concludes.
Model Setup
The economy features patient and impatient households, a …nal goods …rm, a central bank which conducts monetary policy, and a macroprudential authority that sets …nancial regulation. Households work and consume both consumption goods and housing. Patient and impatient households are savers and borrowers, respectively. Borrowers are credit constrained and need collateral to obtain loans. The representative …rm converts household labor into the …nal good. The central bank follows a Taylor rule for the setting of interest rates and the macroprudential regulator uses the LTV as an instrument for macroprudential policy.
Savers
Savers maximize their utility function by choosing consumption, housing and labor hours: max Cs;t;Hs;t;Ns;t
where s 2 (0; 1) is the patient discount factor, E 0 is the expectation operator and C s;t , H s;t and N s;t represent consumption at time t, the housing stock and working hours, respectively. 1= ( 1) is the labor supply elasticity, > 0: j represents the weight of housing in the utility function.
Savers maximize their utility subject to the following budget constraint:
where b t denotes bank deposits, R t is the gross return from deposits, q t is the price of housing in units of consumption, t is the in ‡ation rate, and w s;t is the real wage rate. F t denotes lump-sum pro…ts received from the …rms. The …rst order conditions for this optimization problem are as follows:
Equation (2) is the Euler equation, the intertemporal condition for consumption. Equation (3) is the labor-supply condition and Equation (4) represents the intertemporal condition for housing, in which, at the margin, the bene…ts from consuming housing equate costs in terms of consumption.
Borrowers
Borrowers solve the following optimisation problem:
where b 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor for the borrower ( b < s ), subject to the following budget and collateral constraints:
where b t denotes bank loans for borrowers. These are the converse of savers' deposits. k t can be interpreted as a loan-to-value ratio. 5 The borrowing constraint limits borrowing to the present discounted value of their housing holdings. The …rst order conditions are as follows:
where t denotes the multiplier on the borrowing constraint. 6 These …rst order conditions can be interpreted analogously to the ones of savers.
Firms 2.3.1 Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of identical …nal goods producers that operate under perfect competition and ‡exible prices. They aggregate intermediate goods according to the production function
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The …nal good …rm chooses Y t (z) to minimize its costs, resulting in demand of intermediate good z:
The price index is then given by:
Intermediate Goods Producers
The 
where 2 [0; 1] measures the relative size of savers and borrowers in terms of labor. 7 This CobbDouglas production function implies that labor e¤orts of constrained and unconstrained consumers are not perfect substitutes. This speci…cation is analytically tractable and allows for closed form solutions 6 Through simple algebra it can be shown that the Lagrange multiplier is positive in the steady state and thus the collateral constraint holds with equality. 7 Notice that the absolute size of each group is one.
for the steady state of the model. This assumption can be economically justi…ed by the fact that savers are the managers of the …rms and their wage is higher than the wage received by borrowers. 8 A t represents technology and it follows the following autoregressive process:
where A is the autoregressive coe¢ cient and u At is a normally distributed shock to technology. We normalize the steady-state value of technology to 1.
Labor demand is determined by:
where X t is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost. 9 The price-setting problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun setting. The intermediate good producer sells its good at price P t (z) ; and has a1 2 [0; 1] ; probability of being able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price P t (z) solves:
where "= (" 1) is the steady-state markup.
The aggregate price level is given by:
Using log-linearized versions of (17) and (18), we can obtain a standard forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve b t = E t b t+1 b x t + u t , that relates in ‡ation positively to future expected in ‡ation and negatively to the markup ( (1 ) (1 ) = ). u t is a normally distributed cost-push shock. 10 
Equilibrium
The market clearing conditions are as follows:
The total supply of housing is …xed and it is normalized to unity:
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is set as follows:
We consider a standard Taylor rule which responds to in ‡ation and output, with interest-rate smoothing, where R 0; R y 0 measure the response of interest rates to current in ‡ation and output deviations from the steady state, respectively. R is the steady-state interest rate. However, we impose a ZLB constraint on the interest rate so that it cannot reach negative values when it follows the Taylor rule.
Thus, R T R t is the policy rate implied by the Taylor rule while R t is the actual rate, both expressed in gross terms.
A Macroprudential Rule for the LTV
In standard models, the LTV ratio is a …xed parameter which is not a¤ected by economic conditions.
However, we can think of regulations of LTVs as a way to moderate credit booms. When the LTV is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint is binding, borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. Literature on macroprudential policies has proposed rules for the LTV so that it reacts inversely to variables such that the growth rates of GDP, credit, the credit-to-GDP ratio or house prices. These rules provide a simple illustration of how a macroprudential policy could work in practice. We assume that the objective of the macroprudential regulator is to avoid situations that lead to an excessive credit growth; when there is a boom in the economy or house prices increase, agents borrow more. Therefore, we take deviations of credit and output from their respective steady states as leading indicators of credit growth and consequently consider a rule for the LTV, so that it responds to credit and output:
where k SS is a steady state value for the LTV, and b 0; y 0 measure the response of the LTV to borrowing and output, respectively. This kind of rule delivers a lower LTV in booms, when credit and output are high, therefore restricting the credit in the economy and avoiding a credit boom derived from good economic conditions. 11
Baseline Parameter Values
For simulations, we create two types of environments; one which we call "normal times," in which the steady-state annual interest is 4% as in the standard RBC models, and a second one called "low interest rate" in which the steady-state interest rate is 2%. For the "normal times" case, the discount factor for savers, s , is set to 0.99 to match a 4% interest rate in the steady state. The discount factor for borrowers in this scenario is set to 0.98. 12 For the "low interest rate" environment, we set s to 0.995.
In order to keep the same di¤erence across agents'discount factors in both scenarios, we set b to 0.985 in this case. The steady-state weight of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0.1 in order for the ratio of housing wealth to GDP to be approximately 1.40 in the steady state, consistent with the US data, as in Iacoviello (2005) . We set = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1. 13 For the parameter controlling leverage, we set k SS to 0.90, in line with the US data. 14 The labor income share for savers is set to 0.64, following the estimate in Iacoviello (2005) . For the Taylor rule, we consider the standard values R = 0:5 and R y = 0:5. For we use 0 so that we rule out smoothing from the rule and it is comparable to the case in which the economy is hitting the ZLB.
We simulate the response of the model to a technology shock. We assume that technology, A t , follows 1 1 Funke and Paetz (2012) consider a non-linear version of this macroprudential rule for the LTV. 1 2 Lawrance (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0.95 and 0.98 at quarterly frequency. We take the most conservative value. 1 3 Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) show that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimates could have a downward bias of 50%. 1 4 See Iacoviello (2015) .
an autoregressive process with 0:9 persistence and a normally distributed shock. 15 Table 1 presents a summary of the parameter values used: The GFC has caused us to re-think about existing models and re-shape them in order to appropriately re ‡ect the changes that are occurring in the economy. For instance, standard solution methods for DSGE models did not take into account the possibility of having the interest rate constrained at the ZLB, which has been proven to be a crucial feature of the economy, especially after the recent …nancial crisis. Large enough shocks, under these traditional methods, bring the policy rate to negative levels, violating the ZLB. However, we now know that the ZLB constraint for the interest rate is not just a theoretical curiosity, partly due to falling neutral interest rates. Even absent of large shocks, we have seen many economies across the world interest rates hitting their lower bounds. Therefore, it is important to be able to introduce this constraint in monetary policy models.
Considering occasionally binding lower bounds poses a technical challenge to solving DSGE models. In this paper, we use the solution method proposed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) , namely the "occbin" toolbox, 16 which implements a piecewise-linear approximation to solve DSGE models with Real interest rate Figure 1 : Impulse responses to a negative productivity shock occasionally binding constraints. The key advantage of the toolbox is to solve for the rational expectations solution with unknown durations of each regime. For instance, in this method, the duration of the binding regime does not need to be …xed at a predetermined value but depends on the realization of shocks. In fact, how long a regime is expected to last a¤ects the value of the endogenous variables contemporaneously. The "occbin" toolbox uses a guess-and-verify procedure to generate time-varying policy functions depending on the expected duration of regimes at each period. 17 In our case, the constraint that binds occasionally is the ZLB. Under one regime, the ZLB constraint is slack. Under the other regime, the constraint binds. Using this toolkit, we linearize the model under each regime around the non-binding steady state.
To illustrate how the occasionally binding ZLB a¤ects the dynamics in our model, we compute impulse responses to a productivity shock, using both the standard solution method and the "occbin"
toolkit. In this case, the LTV is set to its steady state value of 0.9 and no active rule is allowed. Figure 1 presents impulse responses to a negative productivity shock for the case in which the by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) yields the same path for the endogenous variables as his approach. This is the case of our model. 1 7 See Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) for further explanation on the "occbin" toolkit and the solution method.
economy is not constrained by the ZLB (blue dashed line) as opposed to the occasionally binding ZLB case (red solid line). 18 The upper-left panel displays the annualized level of the policy rate. It starts from the steady state level of 4%. We see that, when there are occasionally binding constraints for the interest rate, the policy rate reaches the zero lower bound and stays there for a couple of periods before converging to the Taylor rule interest rate. The non-constrained interest rate, however, becomes negative. This discrepancy between the two rates makes the rest of the variables also behave di¤erently.
In particular, both output and in ‡ation respond in a much stronger manner in the world in which the interest rate is constrained. The deeper output recession in the occasionally binding model is driven by two channels. Firstly, the negative impact of the productivity shock is ampli…ed by the collateral channel of borrowers, even without a ZLB. As shown in blue dashed lines, when the negative shock hits, house prices fall and tighten the collateral constraint for borrowers. This, in turn, negatively a¤ects credit via the collateral constraint. This feedback loop between house prices and credit gives rise to a powerful …nancial accelerator, emphasized in Iacoviello (2005) . Even though, in this case, the central bank can support the economy by cutting the interest rate dramatically, the economy su¤ers an output recession.
Secondly, when the interest rate is restricted by the occasionally binding ZLB, the latter provides an additional ampli…cation of the shock. In this case, the occasionally binding ZLB economy su¤ers an even stronger recession, because the combination of de ‡ation and the binding ZLB of the nominal interest rate pushes up the real cost of borrowing. The rise in the real interest rate depresses house prices and credit further, triggering the collateral e¤ect on the real economy. As shown by the red solid lines, in the occasionally binding economy, the interest rate falls to zero and stays there for a few periods. In the meantime, in ‡ation falls sharply, pushing up the real interest rate. As a result, house prices, credit and output decrease by more than in the case where the ZLB is ignored.
With this example, we show that explicitly modelling the occasionally binding ZLB delivers an enhanced propagation mechanism via the collateral channel for both real and …nancial variables. The importance of the collateral channel is much greater when the steady-state interest rate is low. In the next section, we illustrate this point formally by simulating the model under di¤erent steady-state interest rates (high and low). 1 8 For illustrative purposes, we consider a size of the shock large enough to make the ZLB bind.
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In recent years, and especially in the post-crisis period, long-term interest rates have trended downwards persistently. The decline in interest rates has implications both for …nancial stability and the implementation of monetary policy. In this section, we explore the consequences of a low steady-state interest rate, when an occasionally binding ZLB is explicitly considered. To address this question, we simulate our model with the same productivity shock process under two levels of steady-state interest rates (high and low). The LTV in these experiments is …xed at the steady-state level.
In the …rst setting, which we call "normal times," we set the annualized steady-state interest rate to be 4%, as in the standard real business cycle literature. 19 As an alternative, to re ‡ect post-crisis times, we construct a scenario, which we call the "low interest-rate" environment, in which the interest rate in the steady state is 2%. Both simulations are done using the "occbin" toolkit in order to allow for occasionally binding ZLB constraints, which is crucial for the propagation mechanism in the low interest-rate economy. Given the same size of shocks, we show that, in a low interest-rate environment, the interest rate is more likely to hit the ZLB and the economy is more volatile than the economy with a high interest rate. Figure 2 shows the simulated economy under a productivity shock. 20 We consider the two scenarios; "normal times" and "low interest rate," and plot them together for comparison. The black solid line corresponds to the 2% steady-state interest rate, while the red dashed line indicates the 4% steady-state interest rate economy. We can observe that in "normal times" the economy never hits the ZLB, while in the "low interest-rate" setting, the constraint binds several times and for extensive periods. Furthermore, in "normal times" the economy is less volatile than in a "low interest-rate" environment. Having interest rates permanently low, as it is currently the case in many economies, has important implications for economic dynamics. First of all, when we are in a "low interest-rate" environment, even small business cycle shocks can make the interest rate hit the ZLB frequently. As a result, monetary policy becomes less e¤ective, because it loses its ability to further stimulate the economy, when the interest rate reaches zero. In this case, it results in a more volatile macroeconomy, as we can see in the upper-right panel of …gure 2.
Furthermore, low interest rates create an environment of ampli…ed …nancial cycles. This can be clearly 1 9 Since the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1982) , the literature on DSGE models had traditionally considered a calibrated value of the discount factor of 0.99, to pick up the value of the interest rate in the steady state. It was considered that a reasonable value of the steady-state interest rate was 1% in a quarterly model (4% annualized).
2 0 We consider a 0.03% shock to technology for simulations. seen in the lower panels of …gure 2, in which we observe that the volatility of debt and house prices is much higher for the "low interest-rate" economy as compared to the "normal time" economy. This is a consequence of the …nancial accelerator mechanism built into the model, interacting with constrained monetary policy. A model with collateral constraints presents a powerful …nancial accelerator, which allows for feedback loops between asset prices and credit. High house price increases the collateral value and relaxes the borrowing constraint for borrowers. This, in turn, creates aggregate demand e¤ects from both borrowers and savers through both collateral and wealth e¤ects. Such an environment, combined with less e¤ective monetary policy which is occasionally binding at the ZLB, can produce both substantial …nancial expansions and catastrophic meltdowns.
As the previous simulations show, economies with …nancial frictions and low interest rates are particularly vulnerable when the conventional monetary policy is subject to the ZLB constraint. This circumstance calls for the need of other policies to stabilize the economy. A natural candidate that could help monetary policy in this situation is macroprudential policy. 21 Thus, a conclusion that we could extract from the simulation exercise is that, in a low interest-rate world, the case for using macroprudential policies is even stronger: …rst, it can be used to deal with …nancial instability, which is an important problem in this case. Second, it can act as a complement to monetary policy when it hits the ZLB to stabilize the real economy. Indeed, we …nd that macroprudential policies are more needed in a "low interest-rate" economy than in "normal times."
For the rest of the paper, we use the "low interest-rate" environment as the benchmark calibration and study how active LTV rules can help monetary policy to stabilize the economy.
How Can Macroprudential Policy Help?
We have seen in the previous section that a "low interest-rate" environment calls for the use of macroprudential policy. In this paper, as in Angelini et al. (2014), we take the presence of the macroprudential regulator as given and study the e¤ect of this policy on the economy and its interaction with monetary policy. As a …rst step, we demonstrate the e¤ectiveness of macroprudential policy by studying the impulse responses with and without an active LTV policy rule responding only to credit. Then, we extend the class of the LTV rules to more variables and identify the optimal policy coe¢ cients that minimize a loss function for the macroprudential regulator.
An LTV Rule responding to Credit
To develop some intuition, we …rst compare the impulse responses of the model with and without an active LTV rule. We take the monetary policy rule as given. We …rst study a simple LTV rule that responds only to credit:
where we tentatively set the reaction parameter b to 0:2. First of all, without an active LTV policy, the interest rate immediately drops to the ZLB and stays there for a few periods. The economy su¤ers a deep recession, where both output and in ‡ation fall.
As discussed above, the e¤ect of a negative productivity shock is ampli…ed by the collateral channel and the rising real interest rate due to the binding ZLB. By contrast, when a countercyclical LTV rule can be used to help the economy, it relaxes the LTV by about 10 percentage points. As a result, the The main message that we obtain is that, when monetary policy is limited by an occasionally binding ZLB, a countercyclical LTV rule can help to stabilize the economy by both mitigating the collateral e¤ect and lifting the interest rate out of the ZLB. 22 Next, we study the optimal setting of the LTV rule by minimizing a loss function of the macroprudential authority.
Optimal Simple Rules for the LTV
In the following section, we assess the optimal combination of parameters in the LTV rule, which minimizes a loss function of the macroprudential authority. In our search for optimized LTV policy parameters, we take monetary policy as given. 23 As in Angelini et al (2014), we assume that the macroprudential authority cares about the variability of credit, as a proxy for …nancial stability, and the variability of the instrument. This gives rise to a loss function in the following form:
where 2 b and 2 LT V are variances of credit and the LTV, respectively. is the relative weight that the macroprudential authority assigns to the targets. We use = 10 in our policy experiences. 24 We use the loss function of the macroprudential regulator to evaluate di¤erent combinations of the policy coe¢ cients in the simple rule described by equation (23) . Then, searching over a grid of parameters, the solution of this problem is represented by the following expression:
subject to the model equations.
As a …rst approach, we consider a rule in which the macroprudential regulator only responds to credit deviations from the steady state, that is, we impose y = 0. Then, we extend the rule to allow the macroprudential instrument to also respond to output. The motivation for the extension of the rule is that when the economy reaches the ZLB, monetary policy loses its e¤ectiveness to stabilize the economy.
Thus, we study whether macroprudential policies could be used as a complement to monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilization. Table 2 displays the optimized parameters for the proposed macroprudential rules and the corresponding variances of key variables. 25 We take the case when there are no macroprudential policies as a benchmark, and compare it with the model in which the active LTV rules is at work. We do these exercises for both the "normal times" (4% steady-state interest rate) and the "low interest-rate" 2 3 In this paper, we do not address the optimal coordination between macroprudential policy and monetary policy, as in Angelini et al (2014) . 2 4 Given that credit is much more volatile than the LTV, in order to obtain an internal solution of the minimisation, we set a large weight to the LTV. The value does not drive our results in Table 2 . We show the robustness in an Apendix. 2 5 In optimal simple rule simulations, we use R y = 0 in the Taylor rule, so that monetary policy focuses purely on price stability, while macroprudential policy is in charge of macro stability. This separation brings cleaner numerical results. environment (2% steady-state interest rate). Comparing these two environments helps us to make the point that the macroprudential policy implementation should be di¤erent in a world in which long-term interest rates are low and the economy hits the ZLB frequently. For comparison, we …rst report the value of the loss function and the corresponding volatility of output and credit in the economy in which no active LTV policy is in place. As seen in the …rst panel of the table, driven by the same size of productivity shocks, the economy in normal times is signi…cantly less volatile than that in a low interest-rate environment. As we discussed before, in the low interest-rate world, the ZLB is binding more frequently. Lacking an e¤ective stabilization policy, the economy becomes more volatile in both the real and …nancial sector. This …nding motivates the need for macroprudential policies to enhance economic stability, especially in the low interest-rate environment.
When we introduce an active LTV rule responding to credit only, as seen in the middle panel of Table 2 , we see that …nancial stability is improved dramatically without compromising macroeconomic stability. In normal times, the macroprudential policy delivers a much lower variability of credit and it also helps with macroeconomic stability. In the 2% interest-rate world, however, the optimized LTV rule has to respond to credit more aggressively, and it dampens mostly the volatility of credit, but the e¤ect on the variability of ouptut is much muted. This result indicates that, when monetary policy is restricted by the occasionally binding ZLB, purely credit-focused macroprudential policy might be less helpful for the real economy. This …nding points to a more active role for macroprudential policy in stabilizing the real economy.
In the bottom panel of the table, we experiment with an extended version of the LTV rule that responds to both credit and output. Results show that, in normal times, since monetary policy already does its job properly, there is no need for the LTV rule to respond to output directly. The optimized rule is the same as the one responding only to the credit. In this case, the so-called "Tinbergen principle"
applies. Macroeconomic stability would be e¤ectively managed by the monetary authority, while the macroprudential authority only needs to worry about …nancial stability. The two policies work independently, with di¤erent instruments, targeting separate objectives. When the economy is closer to the ZLB, however, the optimized rule responds more strongly to output than to credit. This is because monetary policy is often constrained by the binding ZLB. As discussed above, the binding ZLB becomes a more important distortion in the economy than the …nancial accelerator. In this case, macroprudential policy has to lend a helping hand to monetary policy, to assist macroeconomic stabilization. As a result, the whole economy improves in terms of the volatilities in both the macroeconomic and the …nancial sector, as opposed to the benchmark and the LTV rule responding only to credit.
In summary, in a low interest-rate environment, there are two reasons that strengthen the role of macroprudential policy. First, the low interest-rate world is more prone to …nancial instability, and that calls for the use of macroprudential policies to bring a more stable …nancial system. Second, monetary policy not only loses its e¤ectiveness to bring macroeconomic stability, but also becomes an additional ampli…cation mechanism, when it is constrained by the ZLB. In this case, macroprudential policies can act as a complement to monetary policy by not only responding to credit but also to output.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we build a DSGE model in which interest rates are permanently low and monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB. In this context, we study the implementation of macroprudential policies, represented by an LTV rule. In particular we answer the following research questions: Are macroprudential policies more relevant in a low interest-rate environment? Can macroprudential policies complement monetary policy when the latter binds at the ZLB occasionally?
In order to address these issues we …rst simulate the economy both for "normal times" and for a "low interest-rate" environment. We …nd that when interest rates are persistently low, the ZLB occurs frequently, leading to greater macroeconomic volatility and …nancial instability. In this context, the economy calls for the use of active macroprudential policies to contain …nancial stability and to act to implement a countercyclical LTV rule, which minimizes the loss function of the macroprudential regulator. We …nd that in a low interest-rate environment, macroprudential policies need to be more aggressive in responding to credit. Furthermore, when the LTV is allowed to respond to output, it will respond to output more strongly than to credit, because a binding ZLB not only makes monetary policy less e¤ective in economic stabilization, but also presents an additional ampli…cation mechanism on top of the collateral channel. Therefore, in this environment, macroprudential policies can act as a complement to monetary policy.
